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Abstract: An overview of the European project STRUCTURES and its main challenges is given. Current and foreseen 
Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) threats are classiﬁed according to their availability, their technical 
characteristics (such as bandwidth) and their portability. Critical infrastructures are identiﬁed and their most 
characteristic aspects are highlighted, from an electromagnetic point of view. These concepts are used to establish a set of 
reference threats to be investigated and possible techniques to handle simulations and measurements in this complex 
environment are explored, emphasizing the use of the topological approach.  
1. Introduction to the STRUCTURES project 
Security and quality of life in industrialized countries depend on the continuous and coordinated 
performance of a set of infrastructures that can therefore be deﬁned as critical. Examples of critical 
infrastructures include, amongst others, electrical energy distribution networks, communication networks, 
transportation networks such as railways, motorways and airways, law enforcement structures and public 
health facilities. Their growing interdependency increases even more their vulnerability to external attacks 
aimed at interrupting some of their services.  
Hampering the functionality of such infrastructures using electromagnetic ﬁelds to jam, damage, or shut 
down the electric and electronic systems instrumental to their good performance has becoming a more and 
more effective threat in the recent years [1], [2]. The targets could be very susceptible to such kinds of 
attack, as many of the critical infrastructures are civilian and protected by shielding which is neither 
designed nor tested to resist to high frequency and high power interference. On the other side, more 
portable and more powerful IEMI sources are becoming available, even “off the shelf”. These devices can 
generate various kinds of electromagnetic waves, from narrowband to wideband, from low frequency (e.g. a 
few kilo-hertz) to high frequency (e.g. a few giga-hertz). 
 In the past 25 years, the study of electromagnetic fields produced from high-altitude nuclear 
detonations (known as HEMP) advanced technical knowledge and brought forward good protection 
strategies [3]–[5]. Another, relatively new, kind of attack to be studied, in order to design the proper 
countermeasures, is referred to as HPEM (see  Table 2) [6], [7].  
The European Commission opened a call in the context of the overall FP7 Security Call SEC-2011.2.2-2 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure (structures, platform and networks) against Electromagnetic (High Power 
Microwave (HPM)) Attacks, to investigate such threats. The diversity of structures to be considered, the 
intrinsic complexity of the electromagnetic phenomena, the plethora of existing (and foreseen) attacks, the 
numerous and different issues to be studied (modelling of the attacks, design of sensors, design of shielding, 
etc.) required a multi-disciplinary approach from highly skilled partners.  
The project STRUCTURES started on the 1 July 2012 to address the call. The Consortium is composed of 
13 partners, from 5 countries:  
1. IDS, Ingegneria Dei Sistemi 
2. École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne 
3. Haute école spécialisée de Suisse occidentale 
4. University of York 
5. Montena 
6. Helmut-Schmidt-Universität 
7. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover  
8. Bergische Universität Wuppertal  
9. Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH  
10. University of Twente  
11. Istituto Superiore Mario Boella (together with the Politecnico di Torino)  
12. Navigate Consortium  
Its investigation is divided into three broad phases, described in Table 1. The project faces many issues 
in the ﬁeld of electromagnetic compatibility, ranging from the problem of identifying reference 
conﬁgurations, taking into account all aspects relevant to electromagnetic modelling, to the problem of 
correctly modelling complex scenarios, composed of electrically large structures and many interacting 
elements, for a wide range of parameters. In the following sections, these points will be described in more 
detail. In particular, Section 2 presents a classiﬁcation of IEMI threats; Section 3 describes the different 
critical infrastructures considered in STRUCTURES; Section 4 gives an account of the methods used to deal 
with electromagnetic modelling of complex scenarios, emphasizing the use of the topological approach 
adopted by STRUCTURES.  
Table 1 Project phase division 
Phase 1 focuses on the assessment of the physical 
scenario concerning IEMI attacks:  
 Analysis of present and foreseen threats; 
 Classiﬁcation of critical infrastructures, to 
detect the most salient characteristics, from 
an electromagnetic point of view;  
 Assessment of the most appropriate tools to 
model the threats and the infrastructures;  
 Design of experimental methods to study the 
phenomena. 
Phase 2 concerns the investigation of the IEMI risks 
and the proposal of protection strategies: 
 Experimental characterization of the 
susceptible devices; 
 Simulation of archetypal IEMI attacks, to 
evaluate current protection strategies and 
determine aspects which can be improved;  
 Design of IEMI sensors;  
 Identiﬁcation, design and evaluation of 
innovative protection strategies.  
 
Phase 3 disseminates the results to the scientiﬁc community and to policy makers 
 
Table 2 Acronyms 
IEMI Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference; deﬁned as intentional malicious generation of 
electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signal into electric and electronic systems, 
thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes, see 
[8] 
 
NEMP Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse; an electromagnetic pulse produced mainly from gamma 
rays from a nuclear explosion at any burst altitude, see [9] 
 
HEMP High altitude ElectroMagnetic Pulse; deﬁned as a series of electromagnetic waveforms, 
covering times from nanoseconds to hundreds of seconds, that are generated from a nuclear 
detonation at altitudes above 30 km and then propagate to the Earth surface, see [10] 
 
HPEM High Power ElectroMagnetic; deﬁned as the general area of technology involved in 
producing intense electromagnetic radiated ﬁelds or conducted voltages and currents 
which have the capability to damage or upset electronic systems. Generally the disturbance 
exceeds those produced under normal conditions (e.g. 100 V/m and 100 V), see [7] 
2. Threat analysis of IEMI 
The effect of an electromagnetic attack can be classiﬁed into four different classes: permanent damage, 
upset, interference, and deception. Classification schemes are described in [11]–[13]. The most severe effect 
is damage, where the system needs repair before it can function again. In the case of an upset, the system is 
temporarily disrupted, but not damaged. Interference degrades the functioning of the system only during the 
attack, i.e., once the attack stops the system functions as speciﬁed again. Another effect that can be realized 
with an electromagnetic attack is deception. The system can be spoofed by giving it false information, e.g., 
transmitting a false GPS signal. Several studies have investigated the impact of IEMI on individual electronic 
systems [14]–[19]. The effectiveness of an electromagnetic attack is dependent upon the victim 
susceptibility, the coupling path, and the electromagnetic weapon, i.e., the radio frequency (RF) source 
characteristics. The coupling path can be radiated or conducted and often the complete coupling path is a 
combination of both radiated and conducted. In this section we will focus on the RF source characteristics.  
As mentioned in the introduction, STRUCTURES focuses on HPEM environments. Figure 1 is adopted 
from [6] and helps to understand the relationship of the HPEM environment to other EM environments, such 
as lightning and HEMP. See also Table 2. The difference is that HPEM extends to higher frequencies, up to 10 
GHz, and the ﬁeld levels exceed the typical civil protection levels. HPEM generators operating in the 200 
MHz–5 GHz range are effective in disturbing electronics for several reasons:  
1. Many antennas operate in this frequency range;  
2. Physical dimensions of circuit boxes are resonant in this frequency range (1 to 2 GHz), and typical 
apertures have their resonances in this frequency range; 
3. The inner system coupling paths are approximately a quarter to a full wavelength in this frequency 
range, resulting in effective ﬁeld-to-wire coupling.  
The RF sources creating HPEM environments can be classiﬁed by many attributes, including the 
frequency content, peak electric ﬁeld, pulse repetition frequency (PRF), and pulse length. In [20], four 
categories based on the bandwidth of an IEMI source are distinguished; narrowband, moderate band, 
ultramoderate band, and hyperband. The classiﬁcation is based on the band ratio deﬁned as br = fh/fl, where 
fh is the upper frequency point and fl the lower frequency point. The frequency points are deﬁned such that 
90% of the signal energy is contained within these frequency points. The frequency bandwidth classiﬁcation 
adopted from [20] is presented in Table 3. As an example, in [21] an overview is given of narrowband 
sources and in [22] an overview is given of wideband sources.  
Three different waveforms can be distinguished that are common for HPEM; a narrowband waveform, 
an ultrawideband (UWB) waveform, and a damped sinusoidal waveform. Most waveforms are similar to 
these waveforms or are a combination of them.  
A narrowband waveform can emit a high amplitude burst of pulses at a carrier frequency, with each 
pulse containing many cycles, at a certain PRF, or a continuous signal. The majority of its energy is centred 
around a single frequency, i.e., the carrier frequency. The carrier frequency can be tuned to  a vulnerable 
frequency of the intended target to increase the chance of a successful attack, but this implies that the 
vulnerable frequencies needs to be known a priori. In the case of wireless communication this can easily be 
determined, and the front door coupling can be maximized with a narrowband source tuned to the operating 
frequency of the communication system.  
An UWB waveform is represented by a double exponential pulse with very low rise time and low full-
width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) time. As opposed to the narrowband waveform, this waveform spreads its 
energy over a very wide frequency band, resulting in a relatively low power density. Since a UWB covers a 
large frequency band, it is likely to cover a vulnerable frequency of the victim system. However, as 
mentioned, the power density is relatively low, and the energy of a UWB pulse is very low because it is 
extremely short. This makes it less likely to cause damage to a system.  
A damped sinusoidal waveform is a combination of the previous two waveforms. It has the short rise 
time of a UWB pulse and a carrier frequency carrying a large part of the energy. In Figure 2 the differences 
between the time and frequency content of the waveforms is emphasized.  
As explained in [23], to analyse the risk an RF source poses it is necessary to not only take technical 
attributes into account, but also non-technical attributes. The risk of a source is also dependent on the 
likelihood of occurrence of an RF source attack. For this reason we also classify RF sources by the following 
non-technical attributes:  
 Source technology: Different sources can be classiﬁed by their technical sophistication level in 
assembling and deploying such systems. We divide the levels as described in [6] into; low-tech, 
medium-tech, and high-tech generator systems.  
 Portability: The portability of the sources is divided into four different levels as described in [24]; 
pocket-sized, briefcase sized, motor-vehicle sized, and trailer sized. 
 Availability: Measure of both cost and the technological sophistication as described in [24]. Four 
different levels are classiﬁed ranging from 1 to 4, where 4 means that the availability is low.  
In [2], 17 conducted sources and 35 radiated sources reported in the open literature or available on the 
market were classiﬁed according to their spectral attributes, strength, portability and availability, from 
which general trends were identiﬁed. The previous classiﬁcations aids  the understanding of the risk of a 
possible IEMI source. As an example, the risk of IEMI source increases with a higher portability, since the 
ability to access the target system increases. Similarly for availability and source technology, i.e., low-tech 
generator systems with a high availability are more likely to be used as an IEMI source.  
Within STRUCTURES we analysed 65 possible IEMI sources, both radiated and conducted, available from 
the literature. We classiﬁed the sources by both technical and non-technical attributes. This threat analysis 
functions as a starting point for further research within the project.  
 
Table 3 HPEM classiﬁcation based on bandwidth. 
Band type Band ratio br 
 
Narrowband or hypoband  br < 1.01 
Moderate or mesoband 1.01 < br ≤ 3 
Ultramoderate or subhyperband 3 < br < 10 
Hyperband br ≥ 10 
 
 
Figure 1: HPEM environment and other EM environments. Adopted from [6].  
3. Critical infrastructures analysis, from an IEMI point of view 
Critical infrastructures can be classiﬁed in many ways but typically include [25]: 
 Utilities: Including power generation, electricity, oil and gas distribution and water supply. 
 Telecommunications.  
 Information technology systems.  
 Industrial production, including food production.  
 Transportation systems: Road, rail, sea and air borne transport.  
 Emergency and government services: Including law enforcement, ﬁre and public health services.  
These infrastructures are highly distributed, very complex and also highly interdependent at many 
levels. Rinaldi et al. demonstrate these interdependencies and give an indication of the difﬁculties involved 
in assessing the propagation of widespread simultaneous failures in different parts each infrastructure 
through the chains of interdependencies to give a complete picture of the risk posed to society by a large-
scale IEMI attack [26]. Even for small-scale localized IEMI attacks using less sophisticated sources it is clear 
that there are key points in the interdependencies where signiﬁcant widespread disruption could be caused. 
Whilst outside of the scope of the STRUCTURES project it is worth noting that the operational characteristics 
of critical infrastructures are often key to determining the impact of any IEMI attack. For example, the 
availability and lead-time of replacement specialist electronic components could signiﬁcantly hinder the 
restoration of services if contingency planning has not considered the risks of a widespread intentional IEMI 
attack.  
There is a lot of commonality in these infrastructures with telecommunications and IT increasingly 
providing the essential means of control, monitoring and management of the large distributed networks of 
equipment that constitute a critical infrastructure. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
equipment is widely used for communication of data and control signals between local service installations 
and control centres. At the low level there is also great diversity, especially across the EU, in the speciﬁc 
details and implementations of infrastructures.  
A number of changes in the structure and management of critical infrastructures are currently occurring 
which affect their overall susceptibility to IEMI attacks. In certain regions and for certain infrastructures 
there is an increasing centralisation of the control functions into a small number of national control centres. 
This could allow greater security to be afforded to the equipment inside but also concentrates the key 
control processes for wide areas into a small number of potential targets. “Smart Grid” and similar 
technologies are also beginning to be implemented in utility infrastructures [27]. The increased localisation 
of control and supply this enables could improve the resilience of the service; however, such technologies 
usually make use of low cost sensors, antennas and telecommunications components that are vulnerable to 
IEMI attack. The use of wireless technologies in particular potentially allows low-power front-door 
“jamming” attacks to be perpetrated with very low cost, highly mobile IEMI sources.  
The electronic equipment used in most critical infrastructures is not especially hardened against IEMI. 
Much of the IT equipment is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and the immunity standards applied 
are usually civilian EMC standards with test levels far below those than can be generated by even the least 
sophisticated IEMI sources discussed above. There is limited knowledge of the actual susceptibility levels of 
equipment to IEMI waveforms, though an increasing amount of information has been collected for certain 
classes of equipment such as PCs, network switches and SCADA devices, often with emphasis on HEMP 
sources [10].  
Critical infrastructure installations vary enormously in their characteristics from underground data 
centres with strong physical perimeter security, moderate levels of wall shielding and cable ﬁltering to 
wooden buildings in unpopulated areas with minimal physical security and only basic electromagnetic 
protection. This presents a huge challenge for the analysis of risk associated with IEMI. A simple way to think 
about the vulnerability associated with individual faculties is to consider three characteristics that can be 
scored on a scale from low to high [28]:  
 Accessibility: The ease with which a source can be introduced into a location where it can be 
effective. For conducted sources this could involve gaining access to secured areas or buildings, while 
for radiated sources a location far outside the bounds of the facility may still allow an attack to be 
perpetrated. This is complementary to the mobility characteristic of the IEMI source discussed 
above.  
 Susceptibility: The overall susceptibility of a facility to IEMI is a complex combination of the 
susceptibility of pieces of equipment, transfer functions from the source to each piece of equipment 
and other aspects such as redundancy of critical systems [28]. The susceptibility of equipment can be 
classiﬁed according to whether the effect is transitory, requires systems to be reset or causes 
permanent physical damage necessitating the replacement of components. 
 Consequence: The consequence of an IEMI attack is very dependent on operational features of the 
facility and has to be determined by a detailed analysis that extends far beyond electromagnetic 
considerations.  
The STRUCTURES project is mainly concerned with methods for the determination of infrastructure 
susceptibility and providing mitigation techniques for its reduction.  
4. Possible techniques to handle simulations and measurements in complex 
environments: The topological approach 
 
Substantial efforts have been made during the last three decades to assess electromagnetic (EM) ﬁeld 
coupling to structures and to develop protection against electromagnetic interferences (EMI) [29]–[33]. The 
application of EM numerical simulations have demonstrated outstanding progress, making now natural the 
attempts to model in a more detailed way complex geometries that may be encountered in the real world.  
The need to address the compatibility of facilities against IEMI threats [8] has led to the trend of 
providing more efﬁcient modelling strategies for analysing the response of large complex systems such as 
aeroplanes [34], [35], cars [36], [37], or helicopters [38]; and critical facilities such as electriﬁed railway 
facilities [39], and electric power infrastructures [40], [41]. The main issues that arise when considering the 
analysis of large complex systems are the large amount of required computational resources for handling 
such simulations, and the possibility of including the physical models of the generally neglected (materials, 
junctions, slots) components that are required to obtain accurate descriptions of current distributions [38].  
A. Electromagnetic Topology  
To perform approximate analyses of the response of complex systems, electromagnetic topology (EMT) 
[42] appears to be a very useful tool since it allows subdividing a complicated chain of EM interaction events 
into a number of simpler parts. Within an EMT-based analysis, the response of a system is obtained by 
considering independently all the interaction problems that occur, starting from the knowledge of the 
incident ﬁeld and ending with the internal component response [30]. To illustrate the concept of EM 
topology, Figure 3 presents the EMT of a civilian building subjected to the radiated IEMI generated by a 
HPEM source hidden in a suitcase. In the EMT diagram, a description of the electrical nature of the shielding 
surfaces that form EM barriers bounding the volumes inside the system is made. Civilian infrastructures 
without any special EMC requirement (e.g. communications grounding systems) are typically designed 
without an EM topological division of zones. This complicates the decomposition of critical infrastructures 
into topological layers since they are not very well deﬁned. Also, many of the EM hardening concepts can be 
violated. Conceptually, it is easier to estimate the induced voltage or current responses at a speciﬁed location 
inside the building with the aid of an EMT diagram, because the interaction mechanisms that are responsible 
at each stage of the penetration of the EM wave can be described by separate transfer functions. The 
chaining of all the associated transfer functions will constitute the so-called interaction sequence diagram.  
B. Interaction sequence diagram  
The interaction sequence diagram is a useful tool that represents all possible interaction paths from the 
so-called proper and elementary volumes (see e.g. [30, Chapter 1] or [38]). The interaction sequence 
diagram of systems exhibiting characteristics like those of the structures under study have already been 
addressed in the literature (see e.g. Figure 4 adapted from [33]). In many practical cases, the largest 
contribution to a response within the system is due to transmission lines, which provide a direct 
propagation path from one point to another. Thus, the analysis could be carried out by only evaluating the 
contribution of direct connections to the volume under test.  
C. Simulation techniques at low or intermediate frequencies  
At low or intermediate frequencies, three different types of fully validated numerical tools can be used to 
solve the coupling problem [38] at each shielding level:  
1) Three dimensional full wave simulation codes: 3-D numerical tools are used to solve the problem of EM 
scattering by the system geometry. Fields are calculated in the exterior and the interior of the structures 
using different techniques either in time or in frequency domain. The tools are mainly limited to be used at 
frequencies where the wavelength is comparable to or bigger than the size of the object being analysed. At 
high frequencies, their performance may be limited because of the large amount of computational resources 
required. Three main families of fully validated codes may be distinguished [38]: Volumetric codes, where 
the whole calculation volume is meshed into volume shells (Finite Difference Time Domain, for example); 
Surface codes, where only the surfaces of the diffracting object are meshed (Method of Moments, for 
example); and Asymptotic techniques which are based on an asymptotic formulation of Maxwell’s equations 
(Physical Theory of Diffraction and Uniform Theory of Diffraction, for example).  
2) Cable network codes: Cable network codes are used to solve the wiring coupling problem with a multi-
conductor transmission line (MTL) model, with the previously determined ﬁeld distributions in the local 
shielding level. With MTL models, several key aspects of the wiring in complex systems — such as cable 
shield properties, frequency dependent dielectrics, or inhomogeneous propagating media — can be included 
independently from the cable lengths because the bundles are only speciﬁed from their cross-section. It has 
been established that cable network codes are appropriate for describing the EM coupling in the frequency 
range between DC to about 1 GHz (the upper frequency limit depends on the cross section of commonly 
found cables) [38].  
The MTL model sources stressing the network are described as a set of voltage and current generators 
distributed along the wires length and calculated from the incident electromagnetic ﬁelds. This is how the 
link between 3D full-wave codes and cable network codes is made. The largest advantage of such an 
approach is that the calculation of the incident ﬁelds, which takes time whatever the full wave technique is 
used, is made once for all in the absence of the cable bundles. Then, the MTL solution can be launched for 
various cable topologies, provided that the cable routes remain the same [34], [35].  
Another important advantage of MTL models is that they can be used with an EMT formalism [43] in 
which the wiring network is decomposed as a set of tubes and junctions, respectively, representing the 
network branches and nodes. Currents on the branches are obtained from the frequency domain solution of 
the so-called Baum-Liu-Tesche (BLT) equations describing all the interactions to the network [34]. The 
junctions are described in terms of any type of Z, Y, or S matrices derived from the electric circuits modelling 
the wire connections or loads, or from measurements.  
When dealing with shielded cables, the coupling between the external currents ﬂowing on the cable 
screens and the internal induced voltages and currents is made through the so-called transfer impedance 
and admittance of the screens [32], [44]. The theoretical estimation and measurement of the transfer 
impedance of common cables at frequencies beyond hundreds of MHz become an issue, and poses a 
difﬁculty for implementing the MTL models. It is important to highlight that MTL models do not account for 
radiation and are based on a quasi-TEM ﬁeld response the transmission lines. Such a condition is generally 
observed when the MTL height over the reference plane does not exceed a fraction of the minimum 
wavelength (one tenth or so) (one tenth or so) [30], [45]. Depending on the frequency regime, it may be 
desired to account for the backscattering of cables in order to identify resonant behaviours in the cavities 
containing the wires. However, as far as the TEM mode approximation is concerned, techniques are available 
to handle the ﬁeld emission due to cable-network-induced currents with 3D codes or reciprocity-based 
approaches [32], [38].  
Recent efforts to extend the cable models at higher frequencies have provided methods to generalize the 
MTL models to account for high frequency and radiation effects [45], [46].  
3) Electrical circuit codes: Electrical circuit codes such as SPICE are used to solve the equipment response 
once the currents and voltages at the cable terminations (equipment inputs) are determined. The 
calculations are generally limited to the input of the equipment, and no internal electronic components or 
PCBs are taken into account [38].  
D. Simulation techniques at high frequencies  
1) Toward a statistical approach: At high frequencies the use of the aforementioned tools for the analysis 
of critical infrastructure becomes complicated. Facilities are not generally conceived from an EMT viewpoint 
and some typically made assumptions (e.g. good shielding approximations, or small apertures) may lose 
their validity. Furthermore, high-frequency responses of systems are very sensitive to various parameters, 
some of which are not very well known [38]. Since the design and the placement of components in complex 
systems at high frequencies are not well controlled, statistical models appear to be more appropriate for 
obtaining the response of the system subject to random input parameters [47]. A commonly used approach 
to such a problem has been for years the well-known Monte-Carlo technique which requires a large number 
of deterministic simulations to obtain the probability density function (PDF) of the output of the system [48]. 
In the kind of models required for IEMI studies, where a single deterministic simulation is a major 
computational task, the preferred approach should allow to establish the PDF, or at least some of its 
moments, from a small number of simulations. Methods like the Unscented Transform [47] or the Stochastic 
Collocation method [49] among others, have recently been suggested to be accurate and faster than the 
Monte-Carlo approach. However, their capacities in terms of modelling real system conﬁgurations have yet 
to be demonstrated.  
In the context of IEMI, a statistical approach provides estimates of mean coupling but it does not provide 
any “worst case” scenario. The deﬁnition of the worst case being unclear in the scientiﬁc community, this 
approach can be considered as useful since no deterministic method is currently available to perform such 
an analysis [47]. The deﬁnition of appropriate norms in terms of statistical quantities, as is done for EMT, 
should allow overcoming this drawback [35].  
2) The Power Balance (PWB) Method: The PWB method [50] is another statistical macroscopic approach 
for the EM coupling into oversized complex systems. The PWB method is based on energy equilibrium and 
has been shown to provide satisfactory results at high frequencies. This approach is based on the 
assumption that the EM ﬁelds inside the enclosures of complex systems behave as random variables, as  in a 
mode-stirred chamber (MSC) [51]. The mean dissipated power inside a cavity is calculated as the 
superposition of the losses arising from the coupling of the mean power density through the mean coupling 
cross-section (CCS) of all the dissipative mechanisms present in the cavity as [50], [52]: 〈P〉=〈σ〉⋅ 〈S〉. It is 
shown in [50], [52] that the CCS of any dissipative mechanism σi in the cavity is inversely proportional to its 
associated quality factor Qi. Each CCS may be considered independently from other losses mechanisms, as 
long as the mean stored energy of the cavity is not signiﬁcantly affected by each of the loss mechanisms 
separately. This allows the description of cavities as “current nodes”, where 〈S〉 and 〈P〉 are analogous to 
voltages and currents, respectively [38]. A BLT-like equation can also be derived to solve for the power 
densities and dissipated powers at each node and as a consequence, the PWB method can also be described 
with an EMT formalism [52].  
5. Summary 
The European STRUCTURES project aims at investigating the issue of Intentional Electromagnetic 
interference to the services and infrastructures our lifestyle is based on. This study has a number of critical 
aspects, mainly related to the large size of the problem (both in terms of electrical dimensions and in terms 
of parameters and cases to be accounted for) and the complexity of the interconnections among the many 
parts. We brieﬂy reviewed some topics addressed in the project so far, as classifying the different threats and 
the different targets from an electromagnetic point of view, and identifying the most efﬁcient numerical tools 
and the way to couple them to simulate such complex scenarios.  
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(a) Narrowband waveform. (b) Frequency content of the narrowband waveform.  
 
(c) UWB waveform (d) Frequency content of the UWB waveform.  
 
(e) Damped sinusoidal waveform. (f) Frequency content of the damped sinusoidal waveform.  
 
Figure 2: Time and frequency description of the three different waveforms.  
 
Figure 3: Electromagnetic Topology of a civil building.  
 Figure 4: EMP interaction sequence for shielded systems with unshielded cables. (Figure edited from [30]).  
